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Cash flow and equity income are two altemative  cash-flow tax seems a simple, efficient fonn of
bases advocated for company taxation.  Recent  company taxation, administratively straightfor-
literature has stressed the merits of the cash-flow  ward and neutral with regard to investment
tax because of its simplicity and its neutral  decisions.  The more complicated equity-income
impact on capital and financing decisions.  But  tax is harder to defend in a closed economy.
cash flow taxation merits a closer look in terms
of:  Few countries have had experience with
cash-flow taxes, however, so it is impossible to
* Administrative complexity.  predict what administrative and other practical
difficulties such a tax ;vil pose.
X International tax coordination and competi-
tion.  In a countiy with a large foreign-owned
sector, the equity-income tax may be the best
X Transition  problems.  form of tax for withholding income from for-
eigners.  This is particularly true if the tax is
Intemational issues and administrative  credited against foreign taxes and so, in certain
complexities - particularly tax evasion - circumstances, has little effect on investment.
present problems that must be sorted out before  Otherwise, the tax is distortionary.
a country decides to implement a cash-flow tax.
A case can be made for the cash flow tax in
The motive for adopting a company tax  an open economy as well.  Sometimes  - for
depends in part on the type of personal tax that  example, with petroleum and mining royalties,
is desired and the degree to which a country may  which are meant to be taxes on resource "rent"
wish to withhold income from foreigners. But  - taxes are not credited at all against foreign
the question arises in policy debate about  taxes. The cash flow tax has the virtue of being
whether a particular tax base can be effectively  neutral, while continuing to withhold rents
implemented, taking into account administrative  accruing to foreigners.  (A value-added tax on a
weaknesses and requirements - as well as other  destination basis does not do so, since the tax is
(especially intemational) considerations.  paid only by residents.)
In a closed economy - especially one that
relies on a personal consumption tax - the
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Presented  at the workshop  on the Feasibility  and  Implementation  of Cash-Flow
Company  Taxation,  organized  by the Public  Economics  Division  on June 20, 1988.I.  Introduction
Considerable  interest  has been expressed  in recont  years  by tax
theorists  as well as practitioners  for the taxation  of companies  based  on
their  cash flow.  The approach  is, conceptually,  simple:  the tax base is
just the difference  between the receipts from the sale of goods and
services,  and current  and capital  expenditures  of the enterprise,  during
the period  in question. No effort  is made to calculate  the very tricky
numbers that lie at the core of standard  company  taxes  based on income-
-such  as the  fraction  of the  total  outlay  on an asset  that  actually  befalls
the company  as an economic  cost (depreciation)  in the  period  in question,
which  can  only  be measured  as the  reduction  in the  value  of the  asset  from
one period to the next, except  that this is a complicated  concept  that
cannot  as such  be the  basis  for  taxation  in  practice. Nor is it  necessary,
under  this  alternative  approach,  to  engage  in  complex  exercises  such  as the
separation  of the real cost from the inflation-correction  components  of
interest. Only cash-flow  matters  (whether  on real transactions  only,  or
including  financial  flows,  depending  on the  definition  adopted).l
Unlike  the  equity-income  tax  base,  which  requires  the
deductibility of economic  depreciaticn  and  debt financing  costs,  the  cash
flow  base expenses  capital  at the  point  of purchase,  eliminating  the  need
for the  subsequent  costing  of this  capital  (through  the  compounding  of the
depreciation  it suffers,  and the interest  cost incurred  in financing  it).
The basic principle  of the cash flow tax is thus that the full cost of
capital  is  deductible  as  a stock,  directly  and  fully,  instead  of seeking  to
operate  with the  counterpart  flow  which is  the  annualized  depreciation  and
interest  cost  of holding  that same  capital  in the  years  ahead.  Since  the-2-
true cost of capital  is correctly  and fu'ly  measured  from the  beginning,
the cash flow tax falls  on economic  rents:  the profit  generated  over and
beyond  the user cost of parts,  services,  factors  of production  and risk.
And  with cost  deducted  upfront,  the  form  of finance  does  not  come into  the
equation,  and the tax thus also avoids  the  pro-debt  bias of income  taxes
that does not allow  the imputed  cost of  equity  financing  to be deducted
from  the  base.
Notwithstanding  the econ-mic argument for this novel form of
taxation,  it is noteworthy  that as many major tax  reports  that have been
produced  over the last two decades  have supported  its adoption  as those
that have rejected  it, preferring  instead  to stay within the income-tax
approach  merely  seeking  to  perfect  it.  Thus,  both the  U.S.  Treasury  Report
of 1977 and the  U.K. Meade Report  of 1978 considered  worth  exploring  the
adoption  of cash-flow  taxation  as a form of real tax.  In contrast,  the
1967 Royal Commission  on Taxation  in Canada (the Carter  Report)  and the
U.S. Treasury Report of 1984 argued in favor  of different  streamlined
variants  of the company  tax levied  on equity  income 2--in the second  case
advocating  its partial integration  for both domestic  and foreign  owners
plus  its  full  indexation  for  inflation.
Although  most countries  use equity  income  as the tax base, in
practice the fiscal definition  of income rarely resembles  true equity
income  earned  by  the  shareowners.  For  example,  replacement-cost
depreciation is generally not deductible from the tax base--instead
depreciation  is based on the original  price of the asset.  Interest,
unadjusted  for inflation,  is (almost  always)  deductible  from  the  tax  base,
even though  it is  now  widely  recognized  that it  is only its  real  componentthat should  be allowed  for  deduction. Also,  it is often  difficult  to tax
income  on an accrual  basis,  as for  example  in the case of a project  that
takes several years  to construct before earning income.  And  it is
interesting  to notice  that, in fact,  since it is not possible  to measure
equity  income  accurately,  cash flow  methods  are often  used to tax company
income. This  may include  both the  delay  or non-deductibility  of interest,
and  the  expensing  of  assets  such as  advertising and  research and
development. Thus, most company  tax systems  have some elements  of cash
flow  taxation  even if  they  are  largely  taxes  on accrued  equity  income.
In fact, many company tax systems in less-developed  countries
provide substantial  tax incentives  for capital.  These tax systems  are
neither  "income"  nor "cash  flow"  but some sort of "hybrid"  system,  often
with substantial  tax writeoffs  that subsidize  the use of capital  at the
margin. The incentives  include  tax  holidays,  investment  allowances  and  the
expensing  of capital.  As a result,  these "income"  tax systems  are more
generous  in their treatment  of capital  than cash flow taxes since both
interest  is deductible  and capital  is expensed.  This affords  a "double
deduction"  for capital  outlays  and encourages  the  use of capital  relative
to a  cash flow tax regime.  Moreover, in the presence of these tax
incentives,  the  company  "income"  tax  may  be a  poor  collector  of "rent".
Recent  tax  reform  measures  adopted  by a large  number  of developing
countries  have led to a broadening  of the  company  income  tax  base coupled
with reductions  in statutory  rates. But while  a central  objective  of tax
reform  has  been to move the  tax  base closer  to a duly-defined-income  base,
(i) administrative  limitations  have in some cases turned  out to be more
serious  than  expected; and (ii)  the  political  will to implement  a serious-4-
and comprehensive  reform  of the income  tax  has in some  respects  often  not
prevailed--an  example,  combining  elements  of both of these  points,  is the
view taken  by many policy  makers in various  countries  that a tax system
incorporating  the  main  adjustments  required  to  account  for  inflation  is  too
complicated  to implement.  Instead,  reform  efforts  often  attempt  to make
company  taxable  income  closer  to an accountant's  measure of book profit
earned  by a firm.
On the other hand, it is precisely because income taxes are
difficult to implement--other  than riddled by imperfections--that  some
economists  argue  in favor  of cash-flow  taxation,  on the  basis that it is
simpler to implement.  The tax base does not need to be  indexed  for
inflation.  Neither  is  economic  depreciation  measured. Moreover,  revenues
and  costs  can  be measured  on a  cash  rather  than  an accrual  basis. However,
only in a  few limited cases have cash flow taxes been used for tax
purposes.  Some countries,  which import  capital  from abroad,  have argued
that a rent base is too  small,  and since company  taxes are credited
against  foreign  corporate  taxes,  a shift  from income  to cash flow tax  may
simply  result  in a transfer  of tax revenue  from the capital-importing  to
the  capital-export'ng  countries'  treasuries.  More  importantly,  (i)  policy-
makers  often  fear  that it would  be too  difficult  to implement  a cash-flow
tax in practice,  for a number  of technical  reasons  which  are discussed  in
more detail below.  And, realistically,  (ii) countries  are manifestly
averse to increasing the international  community's  collective  stock of
knowledge  and  experience  on these  matters  by  volunteering  as fiscal  guinea-
pigs, adopting a tax that has been neither tried in practice in any
meaningful  way  nor  sufficiently  thought  through  for  practical
implementation.This paper seeks  to provide  an overview  of the main issues  that
arise  in relation  to the imRlementation  of appropriate  taxes  on companies,
whether  of the cash-flow  or of the income  variety.  The key word  here is
the one underlined:  in particular  it is not our intention  to discuss  the
relative  economic  merits  and properties  of altetnative  tax schemes,  which
is  where  the  literature  is  scrong  and  plentiful. Instead,  what  we do  below
is provide an inventory of the main practical problems that arise in
relation  to the use of cash-flow  vis-a-vis  appropriate  income  taxes,  on
matters of advLinistration  of the tax, international  issues (crediting
between fundamentally  different tax systems), and transition.  But the
practical  evaluation  of the  options  must  also  in  part  be guided  by what  one
wants the rax for--the  relevant  constraints  and objectives  in company  tax
policy,  to  which  we turn  first.
II.  Corgorate  Tax:  Functions  and  Bases
Tax reform  implies  an effort  to improve  the  company  tax.  But  why
should  company  taxation  be imposed  at all?  Since the company  is only a
legal  institution,  would it  not  be more appropriate  to tax  individuals  who
own the  company,  rather  than taxing  the  legal  entity  itself?  This issue
raises  an important  problem: what is  the  economic  role  of the  company  tax?
There are three economic  reasons  for company  taxation  that are
discussed  below:  (a)  the  withholding  function;  (b)  the taxation  of rents,
as payment  for  public  property  rights or privileges; and  (e) the
instrumentation  of economic  policy.  The appropriate  base depends  on the
economic  role  or function  of the  company  tax.  In the  first  section  below,we discuss  the  rationale  for  company  taxes  based  on the function  they  are
suuposed  to serve. Next,  various  tax  bases  are  described  technically,  and
related to the equity-income  and the cash-floi taxes.  In the final
section,  we discuss  the  role  of integration.
1.  Whv  Tax gompanies?
a.  The  Withholding  Function
There  are three  broad  motivations  for the  use of the  company  tax
as a withholding  device  for  the  incomes  accruing  to  capital  owners. These
are  as follows:
First,  it may be difficult  to fully tax some forms of capital
income  exclusively  at the  personal  level. In  particUar, the  retention  of
profits by corporations  gives rise to  accrued  capital gains.  If the
personal tax is fully levied on all forms of income, capital gains,
adjusted for inflation,  should be taxed annually  on an accrual  basis.
However,  it is difficult  to tax accrued  capital  gains at the  personal
level, because of the complexities  invo.-ad  with the valuation  of non-
marketed  assets  or the  problems  for  liquidity-constrained  investors  to  pay
taxes  on accrual  basis. 3 The company  tax,  acting  as a withholding  tax  on
retentions,  ensures  that individuals  cannot  defer  tax payments  by leaving
profit in the company,  rather  than receiving  the income  as dividends  or
interest  income. And relatedly,  by centralizing  at the  company  level  the
taxation  of incomes  deriving  from the company,  administration  is greatly
simplified,  avoiding  having different  individuals'  holdings in the same
company  assessed  separately  for tax purpose--assessments  that would then
need to  be cross-checked  or otherwise  fed  into  a single  assessment  pool to
ensure  consistency.- 7 -
A second  reason  for withholding  income  at the company  level is
related  to the  cash  flow  taxation  at the  personal  level. With a "lifetime"
income or consumption-based tax, savings is exempt from taxation  by
allowing  savings  in designated  assets  to be deducted  from  the  tax  base and
withdrawals  from these assets  to be added to the tax base (this is the
registered  asset  method). Alternatively,  asset  transactions  can  be ignored
with interest exempt from taxation (this is the non-registered  asset
method).  In that case,  taxes  on economic  rents  and labor  income,  unless
withheld  at source,  can  be avoided  by the simple  expedient  of paying  out
these  forms  of income  as dividends  or other  forms  of capital  income  which
escape  taxation  if the asset  is  held in the  non-registered  form.  Thus,  a
company tax such as a cash fiow tax could  be used to withhold  economic
rents  or labor  income  when investments  are  held in the  non-registered  form.
A third  motive  for withholding  tax at the company  level is that
the  revenue  in question  would  otherwise  accrue  to foreign  investors,  and  to
their  tax authorities  at home,  with  little  income  remaining  in the  host
country. This  is of  particular  importance  for  LDCs  in  their  relations  with
industrialized countries, for the typical pattern is that investment
capital  flows  from  the latter  to the  former  and  the  resulting  income  shows
a net flow  in the  opposite  direction,  which  the  host country  wants  to tax.
Section III discusses international  issues in more detail but  it is
worthwhile  to  briefly  outline  the  argument  at this  point.
As a result  of tax  crediting  arrangements,  many countries  with a
significant  foreign-owned  sector  are  able  to  levy  company  taxes  that  are  in
part credited  against  foreign  taxes  that are levied  by capital  importing
countries on foreign-source  income.  In general,  foreign-source  income
includes  branch  profits,  dividends,  royalties  and interest  income,  and incertain  cases  the retained  profits  of subsidiaries. If the  host country
were to eliminate  its company tax, the tax revenue  would in effect  be
transferred  to foreign  treasuries,  without  necessarily  affecting  the  total
tax  burden  of the firm.  What exactly  happens  if and when a host country
decides  to remove  or reduce  the tax  applied  on income  outflows  depends  on
the  details  of tax  arrangements  used  by the  capital  exporting  country  when
taxing  the  foreign-source  income  of resident  multi-national  companies. For
example,  some  capital-exporting  countries  allow,  by treaty,  "tax-sparing":
any tax incentives  given  by host developing  countries  are not offset  'y
increased  taxation  of the income  by the capital  exporting  country.  S,
matters are a central  element  of conventional  double-taxation  agreements
between  countries. Currently,  and  in the  absence  of such  agreements  which
are still more the exception  than the rule between developed  ana less
developed countries,  a  large  number of capital  exporting  countries  tax
foreign-source  incomes  of multinationals  giving  them a credit (perhaps  a
deduction  in the  case  of  non-treaty  countries)  for  foreign  taxes  paid.
b.  Tax  on Rents
The  most  efficient  tax,  assuming  that  revenues  and  costs  are  fully
observable,  is  one  that  applies  to  pure  rents,  that  is  the  excess  of actual
pay over the compensation  required  by an agent for the conduct  of an
activity. By this  definition,  rents  are intramarginal  return  paid  to fixed
factors  of production  once  adjusting  for  the  cost  of risk  and  uncertainty.
Changes  in this margin,  for  example by  taxing  it, would  have no
distortionary  effects  on the investmen,  and production  decisions  of the
agent.  Such rents,  by this  broad  definition,  in principle  can exist  allover the economy, including  for example  the value to an individual  of
buying  a particular  car or retaining  his job.  The problem,  from a tax
perspective,  is one of identification  and measurement:  trying  to tax the
inframarginal  return  to activities  makes  us hit the  marginal  one too, and
hence  confront  the response  elasticities  that so terrify  the tax analyst.
The  one  exception  of  any  practical  importance,  of  pure  rents  awaiting  to  be
taxed,  is given  by the  company  tax,  which  when  well designed  (not  a slight
demand)  is non-distortionary,  In particular  the  cash-flow  tax  operates  as
a rent  tax, since  the  cost ef production  is fully  deductible  from  the tax
base.  The  cost  of risk  is  implicitly  deductible  too,  so long  as tax  losses
are fully  deductible  from  the  base (or  are  made  fully  refundable).
On the  other  hand,  pure rents  generated  by a firm  not only are  a
base that  could  be taxed  efficiently:  their  taxation,  over  and  above  their
role in taxing  the individual  entitled  to the income  in question  can  be
further  justified  in terms  of the services  supplied  by the government  to
the firm--certainly  not all  of that  being  of the  public-good  variety--and
which can be construed  as a  publicly-provided  input.  The government  can
extract  a rental  payment  by auctioning  r,ff  rights  for the use of public
property  or,  as  an alternative,  levy  a cash  flow  tax  that  collects  rents  on
an "ex post"  basis after  adjusting  for risk  and the time  value  of money.
The  cash flow  tax thus  serves  as a proxy  for  rental  payments,  which  should
accrue to the  government  for the use of public  property  or priviledge
provided.  An important  example  of the  above is the  use of non-renewable
resource  property  which  is  often  owned  by the  government  in  many developing
countries.- 10  -
c.  Economic  Policy  Function
Another  role of the  company  tax is to influence  economic  behavior
through  it,  especially  with regard  to investment. There are two reasons
that may be offered  as an argument  for the use of a non-neutral  company
tax:  (i) to offset  inefficiencies  or inequitiets  in the tax system  that
cannot  otherwise  be eliminated,  and (ii)  to offset  market  failures.
The first  of the  above  is  related  to  the  problems  arising  from  the
difficulty  of taxing  some  commodities  in the  economy,  or to tax  them  all  at
the "right"  (highly  differentiated)  rates. Leisure,  or lack  of effort,  is
the  prime  example  of an  untaxable  commodity. But  then,  both  for  efficiency
and equity  reasons  it may be appropriate  to tax  more highly  those  goods
that are complementary  with untaxed commodities. Some economists  have
argued  in favor of income  taxes (including  company  incLme  taxes)  on the
grounds  that  savings  for future  consumption  is complementary  with untaxed
goods such as leisure.  However,  this argument  would support  non-uniform
commodity  taxes in general (i.e.,  tax cottages  and pleasure  travel  more
highly)  rather  than  tax income,  particularly  company  income. We return  to
this  discussion  later  since  the  issue  is related  to the  choice  between  the
consumption  and income  tax  base.  But the span of untaxable  commodities,
particularly  in  LDCs,  goes  much  further  than  the  existence  of "leisure"  (or
lack  of effort),  which is  only the  cextbook  example  of an untaxable  good. 4
Which set of commodities is untaxed is not a universal constant,  but
depends  instead  on the  extent  of integration  of the  economy,  the size  and
nature  of informal  markets  and  hence, in particular,  on the state  of tax
administration.  In this  regard,  to the  extent  that  it  may not  be possible
to tax individuals  directly,  it is easier  to tax businesses  instead,  in- 11 -
their sales, their payroll or indeed their income.  (This is not the
withholding  argument  revisited,  for the  population  affected  by the tax  on
companies  in this  case,  and the  would-be  tax  on 'ndividuals,  are likely  to
be quite  different).  And equally,  payroll  taxes  paid  by companies,  rather
than  wage taxes  paid  by individuals,  may  be easier  to administer.
The  second  argument  for  a  non-neutral  company  tax  is  to offset  the
impact  of market  failures  on the economy. The obvious  example,  which in
some cases can be important,  are activities  whose levels  can somehow  be
deemed  to  be excessive  and  which  should  therefore  be discouraged  by the  tax
system  (e.g.  pollution). Similarly,  in certain  other cases  the level  of
economic  activity  may  be deficient,  such  as is  often  the  case  with research
and development  due to inabilities  to appropriate  privately  the eventual
benefits  of the  program. In this  case the  company  tax  system  may  be used
to encourage  the activity.  Fast  writeoffs,  investment  tax credits  and
above  all  statutory-rate  reductions  are  expedients  commonly  used  in LDCs  to
encourage  investment  in  particular  assets  and industries.
Nevertheless,  although  fiscal  incentives  may ir.  principle  and in
theory  have a worthwhile  role to play, in practice,  more often than  not,
they  are  very  difficult  to  apply  satisfactorily  at all. Other  policy  tools
are often  available  and  preferable. In  particular,  grants  to assist  firms
provide  an alternative  approach. One reason  for  not using  tax incentives
is that tax law is made more complicated  for all taxpayers,  even though
only some  benefit  from such assistance. Another  is that,  unlike  grants,
fiscal  incentives  may not allow the government  to follow  very well the
response of  investment in the sector affected--let  alone to monitor- 12 -
responses  and plans at the level  of the individual  firm.  On the  other
hand, tax incentives  admittedly  are  more easily  put in place,  since  firms
do not  need to go through  a process  of applying  for  grants  which  is quite
an onerous  one.
2.  Company  Bases
The above  threa  functions  or objectives  of the company  tax point
at correspondingly  different  definitions  of the  taxable  base.  Thus,  if  the
rationale  is to withhold  equity  income  in the form of retentions,  this
suggests  that  the  company  tax  base should  be of the  following  type:
BRet  - Ra - Ca - Dep - Int - Div.
where
Ra  - accrued revenues,
Ca  - accrued costs,
Dep  - economic  depreciation  valued  at  replacement  cost,
Int  - real  interest  costs,
Div - dividends. 5
On the  other  hand,  if the  motive  for  corporate  taxation  is  to seek
to  capture  the  rents  generated  by the  firm,  the  tax  base  would  be analogous
to BRet, but  correcting the deductions  allowed on the capital side,
substituting  the  opportunity  cost  of the  capital  base,  rK,  for  the  above
expression's  actual  outlays  on  debt  and  equity  finance, Int  +  Div:
BRent - Ra - Ca - Dep - rK,
where
rK  - real  cost  of debt  and  equity  finance.- 13 -
As pointed  out above,  a rent tax could  be imposed  by expensing
capital  investment  rather  than  deducting  economic  depreciation  and  the  real
opportunity  cost  of the capital  committed,  since  the latter  two  deductions
are  equal  to the  purchase  cost  of capital  in  present  value  terms. This is
the  cash-flow  base,  which  is  defined  as follows:
BCF  - Rr  Cr - I,
where
Rr  - realized revenues,
Cr  - realized current costs,
I  - gross  investment  expenditures.
The above cash flow base is the R-Base  as defined  by the  Meade
Report. There  are  other  bases  that  could  be used.  Of particular  interest
is a "finance  inclusive"  cash-flow  tax,  where all incomings  and outgoings
are treated  as revenues  and costs  for the  purpose  of computing  the  base,
and not only those flows pertaining  to real (production)  transactions.
That is, interest  payment5i  are in this case deductible,  as in standard
income  taxes.  But, in exchange,  the loan itself  is taxable  when first
raised,  as a flow received  by the  firm. (In  effect  the  government  is then
partaking  in the loan  and sharing  in its service). Then the  base is the
following:
BR+F  - Rr - Cr - I - iB  + NB,
where
iB  - interest costs on net  debt (i.e. gross debt net  of
financial  assets),
NB  - net debt issues.- 14 -
Another  cash  flow  base  of interest  is the  S-Base  suggested  by the
Meade  Report.  If we recognize  that  the  cash flow  of the  firm is equal  to
the  flows  paid to  shareholders,  the  base  would  be of the  following  form:
BS - Div - New Equity Issues,
where  capital  buy-backs  are  netted-out  in  the  second  term.
In addition  to the above,  one can develop  other  bases  similar  to
the  cash flow  base.  Boadway  and  Bruce  (1984)  point  out that  any  base  will
qualify, so long that the present values of tax deductions  equal the
economic cost of holding capital.  Among the myriad of uninteresting
possibilities  this statement  could  be applied  to is constructing  a simple
implementable  cash flow tax base.  For example, instead of expensing
capital,  capital  could  be depreciated  at any rate,  so long  as the  capital-
cost allowance  base is indexed  by the rate of interest. This would be
equivalent  to carrying  forward  tax losses,  again  at the rate  of interest.
These  points  will  be discussed  further  in  the  next  section.
The third motive for withholding taxes, namely to tax income
accruing  to  foreigners,  largely  depends,  in its effects,  on what other
countries  do with respect to the  taxation  of foreign-source  income  of
multinational firms.  When capital exporting countries credit foreign
taxes,  then  the  base used  by the  capital  importing  country  should,  to that
extent, correspond to that of foreign countries, to ensure maximal
crediting.  This in itself  is a factor  that militates  against too much
unilateral  creativity  by  LDCs  on matters  of  company  tax  policy.
Specifically,  if the retentions and dividends of  the branches and
subsidiaries  of firms  are fully  taxed  by capital  exporting  countries,  with
a  credit  given  for foreign  company  taxes,  the  appropriate  tax  base in the
host  country  would  be equity  income:- 15 -
By  Ra - Ca - Dep  - Int.
The difference  between  this tax base and BRet is that dividends
are no longer  deductible. In fact,  retentions  of foreign  subsidiaries  are
often exempt from taxation  when multinational  firms are taxed on their
foreign-source income.  When this occurs, one  could argue that the
appropriate  tax base should  be dividends  and other repatriated  income,
assuming  that  the  capital  exporting  country  is  willing  to recognize  this  as
a creditable  tax. In some  instances  this  has  happened,  such  as in the  case
of withholding  taxes  on income  accruing  to foreigners. These  withholding
taxes are often credited against foreign taxes and can be used as a
substitute for the comlany tax as a withholding  device.  However,  the
withholding  tax rates  are usually  set by treaty  and difficult  to adjust.
Thus  the  company  tax  is  used  for  withholding  instead.
None of the above  motivations  for company  taxation  suggest  that
the  tax  base should  be equity  income  (i.e.  including  both retentions  and
dividends).  The argument  for an equity  income  tax is that  withholding  on
both  retentions  and  dividends  is  desirable,  for  personal  tax  compliance  and
for international  reasons. Indeed,  this  was the  view taken  by the  Carter
Report  in its  recommendations  for  corporate  taxation  in  Canada.
There  has been considerable  disagreement,  however,  regarding  the
appropriate  base that should  be used for company  taxation. Much of the
debate  is  related  to  whether  the  return  accruing  to savings  should  be taxed
at both the personal and company levels.  Those who have advocated  a
consumption-based  tax at the  personal  level  sometimes  argue  in favor  of a
similar  tax  at the  company  level  to  withhold  rents  and  labor  income. Those- 16 -
in favor  of a comprehensive  income  tax often  argue  in favor  of a company
tax  for  the  purpose  of withholding  income,  because  it is  difficult  to fully
tax capital income  at the personal  level.  Company  and personal  taxes
should  thus  be fully  integrated  to  avoid  double  taxation.
The  advocates  of consumption-based  taxes  argue  that  consumption  or
lifetime  wealth  are the  appropriate  measures  of well-being. The return  to
savings  should  not  be viewed  as income. It is  just the  price  society  pays
to transform  current  into future  consumption. Thus cash flow taxes are
best to use for the purpose of taxing  companies.  On the other hand,
advocates  of income  taxation  view annual  income  (labor  and  capital  income)
as the  best indicator  of individual  welfare  measured  as 'capacity  to pay."
They al.so  argue that income  from savings  gives rise to economic  power,
which  like  any  consumption  should  be the  subject  of taxation.
The  debate  amongst  economists  regarding  the  desirability  of cash-
flow taxation, and more generally the appropriate  choice of base for
company  taxes,  has been fairly  academic  in  nature,  largely  concentrated  if
not restricted  to efficiency  and  equity  issues. The  theoretical  arguments
in favor  of the main approaches  are fairly  well-known,  and so it is an
empirical  issue  as to  which  base is  more efficient. Unfortunately,  if the
choice between the tax bases is to be settled on empirical grounds,
considerable  patience  is in order  before  a winner  emerges,  for  empirical
estimates  of behavior  in intertemporal  settings,  in particular  on savings
responses  to interest-rate  changes  (taxes),  are  not widely  available,  nor
is what is available  much better than suggestive,  depending  largely  on
strong assumptions  and scant data to capture (or assume  away) the many
determinants  of all  kinds  that come to play in determining  investment  and- 17 -
savings  decisions. What is  clear  is that  neither  theoretical  argument,  nor
the evidence available,  nor even recourse  to administrative  arguments,
support  neither  the  view that  capital  income  should  not  be taxed,  nor that
if it is, the rate of tax  ought  to be equal  to the rate of tax on labor
income.
In some ways, much of this debate is misdirected.  Although
efficiency  and equity  issues  clearly  have critical  importance,  the  actual
impact  of given  policies  in these  very domains  depends  critically  on the
administrative  capabilities  and on the nature of the economy  at large.
Discussions  are often  conducted  as if the  consumption  or income  tax  bases
can  be fully  implemented.  Yet  there  are  a number  of problems  that  would  be
faced in trying  to  put in  place  a cash-flow  tax--or  indeed  a proper  equity
income  tax particularly  under  high inflation. Similarly,  actual  outcomes
under the efficiency  and equity  headings  depend  on the transition--the
arrangements  used  and the  path followed  in  moving  from  one  tax  to another.
Lastly,  most studies,  especially  in the United States,  are based on an
analysis  of closed  economies. Yet some  of the  most important  issues  in
the  discussion  relate  to the  institution,  in  one  country,  of an alternative
tax base that is not being followed  by other  countries:  international
crediting  and interaction. This problem  applies  both to a fully indexed
equity  income  tax as well as to the  taxation  of cash flow.  These  issues
are  discussed  in  Section  III.
3.  Personal  Taxes:  Integration
It is often  argued  that  a cash-flow  tax,  which  can  be deemed  as a
tax on company  rents  flowing  into final  consumption,  can  only  be operated
in conjunction with  a personal consumption tax.  This, however, is- 18 -
incorrect:  it is  not true that  overall  consistency  in the  design  of direct
taxes,  seeking  to tax either  incomes  or consumption  uniformly,  necessarily
requires  that bases at the  personal  and company  levels  be analogous  from
the outset:  appropriate  crediting  arrangements  can do the trick.  And in
fact such consistency  is not always  necessarily  a requirement:  partial
implementation  of a good principle (if taxing consumption  rather than
income  is indeed  a good thing)  may be superior  to poorer  implementation,
due  to  administrative  or  other  limitations,  of the  whole  story.
On the  one  hand,  it is  possible  to  operate  a company  equity-income
tax alongside  a personal  consumption  tax, so long as the company  tax is
fully integrated  by paying  a tax credit  to the owners  of capital.  In a
closed economy such integration  can be easily achieved.  In an open
economy,  however, integration,  if done for both domestic and foreign
owners,  makes company taxation  less attractive,  since  otherwise-withheld
income accruing to foreigners is then lost.  On the other hand, if
integration is achieved for domestic shareholders  only, it may only
subsidize  savings  without  affecting  the impact  of the company  tax  on firm
production  and investment  decisions,  at any rate for joint ventures  or
firms  with a p-esence  in international  capital  markets. 6 The reason  for
this is that a company can  finance capital from both domestic and
international  sources--integration  for  domestic  shareholders  encourages  an
increased  ownership  of assets,  but  not company  investment  since  the  latter
is  based  on the  international  cost  of funds.
On the other hand, and more directly  of interest  here, it is
similarly  possible  to operate  a cash  flow  tax  in the  presence  of a  personal
income  tax. For instance,  suppose  all  capital  income  is  fully  taxed  at the- 19  -
personal  level. It remains  nonetheless  quite  possible  to seek to tap  some
of the neutrality  properties  of the cash-flow  tax with respect to the
choice  of project  and  mode of finance  by the simple  expedient  of levying
this tax  on the company  rents,  with no integration  with the  personal  tax.
Something  will  have  been  lost  relative  to the  case  where  both the  corporate
and the  personal  sectors  are taxed  on a cash-flow/consumption  basis.  But
that  benchmark  is not relevant  here.  If it is granted  that the  personal
consumption  tax is administratively  out of the question  at present  in an
LDC-context,  which  we take to be the case, the relevant  alternatives  to
consider  are to tax incomes  throughout  the economy,  or to tax company-
income  rents,  with its  attractive  economic  properties  but  at the  expense  of
integration.  The  alternatives are feasible, and the choice problem
interesting,  non-obvious.
Nevertheless,  the  cost  that  relinquishing  (or  opting  for  imperfect
forms of) integration  represents  must not be minimized.  With imperfect
integration,  differences  in tax  bases and tax rates at the personal  and
company  levels  not only distort  certain  decisions  at the margin  (the  net
earnings  from  the  marginal  dollar  being  non-uniform):  more importanty,  they
allow for tax arbitrage, as different kinds of incomes or costs are
shuffled  before  the tax-man's  eyes for  maximum  tay  benefit.  Many of the
practical  implementation problems  to be  discussed below,  such as
observability  of the  tax  base,  compliance  and  the  treatment  tax  losses,  are
accentuated  when  personal  and  corporate  taxes  are  not  fully  integrated.- 20 -
'II.  Imglementation
We now  turn  our  attention  to  some  of the  main  issues  that  arise  in
relation  to the  practical  implementation  of  an appropriate  company  tax  once
this is chosen,be  it on income  or on rent.  The discussion  is organized
under three main headings:  (i) administrative  issues,  under idealized
conditions  ignoring  both interactions  with the  rest  of the  world  as  well  as
the  transition  from  where  we  may  be to  where  we might  want to  be; (,i)  open
economy issues, highlighting the limitations  and requirements  that the
existence  of transactions  with other  countries,  and  of income  flows  across
borders,  pose for the conduct  of an independent  company  tax policy;  and
finally  (iii)  transition  issues,  in  particular  in  what  concerns  the  gradual
(or  otherwise)  shift  from  one  base to another--in  a policy  area  where the
treatment  of stocks  in place  is  by definition  at the  center  of the  story:
both  depreciable  assets  and interest  from outstanding  debts.  Both the
indexed  equity-income  and the  cash-flow  taxes  are  discussed.
1.  Administrative  Issues
There  are  several  areas  of  concern,  on the  general  question  of the
administration  of a company  tax,  that  relate  directly  to the  choice  of the
tax  base.  On the  one  hand,  a range  of questions  that  can  be grouped  under
the  heading  of observability  of the  tax  base--that  is,  fiscal,  conceptual
definition  and  accounting  implications,  under  honest  reporting. And  on the
other,  the complementary  general  problems  of tax evasion  and avoidance,
which are of course  particularly  critical  in many LDCs;  in particular  the
treatment  to be given to tax losses,  and the tax-planning  opportunities
that  these  afford.- 21 -
a.  Observability  of the  Tax  Base
There  are  several  problems  that  arise  under  the  equity-income  tax,
with respect  to the  measurement  of the tax  base by the firm's  management
and  by the  tax  authorities  alike,  where  the  cash-flow  tax  has an advantage.
Some  of these  are  that,  under  an income  tax:
i.  The  concept  of income  requires  revenues  and  current  costs  to  be
reported  on an accrual  rather  than  cash  basis,  which  creates  a
problem  in  the  determination  of tax  liabilities  when the  timing
of revenues and expenses is  mismatched.  This arises in
situations  when income  is generated  at a later  time  relative  to
the  deduction  of  input costs,  such as  in the cases of
construction  projects,  resource  deposit  discoveries,  financial
income  not  paid  on  a yearly  basis,  and  property  capital  gains.
ii.  In particular,  capital  gains  create  a problem:  in principle  it
is accrued  capital  gains  or losses  that should  be the subject
of taxation  and deductions,  but these  are only in some cases
monitorable  even if only imperfectly  (e.g.  through  adjustments
in depreciation  provisions).  And even the use of realized
capital  gains,  already  a poorer  substitute,  is itself  subject
to  problems  of  measurement.
iii. Relatedly,  and notably, economic deprkriation--the  physical
wear and  tear  of assets,  valued  at replacement  cost  net  of real
capital  gains--is  notoriously  difficult  to  measure,  especially
in  countries  that  have  thin  secondary  markets  for  capital.- 22 -
iv.  The treatment  of inventories,  of inputs  or outputs,  and hence
the implicit  coscing  of goods actually  sold, is similarly  a
problem.  Simplified ad-hoc rules to allocate the "true'
economic  cost associated  to current  revenues  must always  be
resorted  to.
v.  On the other hand, a good equity-income  base in principle
requires interest deductions to be adjusted for inflation.
This requires  not only the reporting  of interest  costs,  but
also  the  value  and  in effect  the  composition  of debt
liabilities.  This can be difiicult to accomplish since
detailed  accounting  is  required. 7
vi.  And last, it is impossible  to measure  in a remotely  adequate
fashion  the  right  depreciation  for  a number  of assets,  such  as
research  and development,  advertising,  depletable  assets,  and
other capital expenditures, which are thus expensed on a
current  basis  in  most  tax  systems.
With cash flow  taxation,  at any  rate in its  basic  definition,  the
problem  of measuring  the  base is greatly  simplified  from  the economic  and
accounting  points of view, since all of the above problems  essentially
disappear.  The use of sales less purchases realized (or of variants
discussed  in §II-2 above,  such as that incorporating  financial  flows)  as
the  base  of the  tax  eliminates  any fiscal  role for  the  concept  of economic
costing. This rids  the  tax  administration  of the  need  to deal  at all  with
questions  pertaining  to  the  timing  of benefits,  capital  gains,
depreciation,  and inventory  flows,  all  of which  remain  the firm's  but not
I- 23 -
the  tax  authority's  concerns.  Capital gains  and depreciation, ir
particular,  disappear  as legal  concepts  and  headaches,  for all purchases
are simply  deducted  in full  when made,  with no memory  of that transaction
being then  necessary. Any subsequent  capital  divestiture  or stripping  at
the end of the day are then treated as fully fresh forms of taxable
revenue.
Inflation  adjustment too becomes unnecessary: 8 both for the
depreciation  side, where the requirement  to adjust for inflation  is a
traditional (and obvious) concern;  but also, and more critically,  in
relation  to  interest  payments, where  the adjustment for inflation
(sometimes  dubbed "monetary  correction"  of the principal,  prior to the
add:  tion  of real interest)  is increasingly  recognized  as an urgent  must in
non-indexed  high  inflation countries, but  one whose  administrative
requirements  are very considerable  indeed  (as  exemplified  by the case of
Mexico,  a country  with one of the strongest  tax administrations  in LDCs,
and  where  a thorough  reform  of income  tax  along  these  lines  was introduced
in early  1987,  giving  rise to enormous  administrative  difficulties  in the
early  stages  of the  process).
On the other hand new problems arise in cash flow taxation
relative to an income tax.  The immediate  expensing of buildings  and
structures,  although  technically  desirable  and similar in nature to any
other  business  expense,  can  be a problem,  giving  rise  to enhanced  evasion
opportunities  (to which we turn in the next section)  and in particular
yielding  an exceedingly  lumpy  time  profile  of tax  obligations,  which  may in
fact  make it  necessary  to create  a special  regime  for them in some  cases.- 24 -
The taxation  of financial  institutions  is a serious  problem,  which again
requires  them  to  be treated  on an ad-hoc  basis:  the  reason  is that  most of
their  revenues  and  outlays  are financial  flows,  to which  the tax  does  not
apply,  and  then they  do buy equipment  and  materials,  technically  leaving  a
negative  net cash flow.  (The  lending/borrowing  spread  is what in effect
creates  the  rent  the  tax  wants  to  but cannot  catch.) And  most importantly,
apart from significant  but specific  (sectoral)  examples,  the tax  has not
been implemented  in a comprehensive  way in any country.  This lack of
precedent  and experience  makes it difficult  to predict  what exactly  other
difficulties  in the  administration  of the  tax  might  turn  out  to  be.
The picture,  therefore,  is not clear,  on whether  or not the  cash
flow tax is superior to income taxes from the purely administrative
(accounting  and  definitional)  point  of  view.  It is stronger  "at  the  core",
in that the definition  of the tax base for the majority  of productive
sectors  is very straight-forward--and  this is potentially  an interesting
consideration  for  developing  countries  in particular,  where  accounting  and
administrative  capabilities  are typically  very modest.  But on the other
hand the tax presents  serious  problems  "at the fringes",  such as in the
treatment of certain major sectors or, as discussed  in §II-3, in the
interface  with a personal  income  tax.  Perhaps  these  problems  do not  quite
overweigh the essential  simplicity  of the tax, and its neutrality  vis-
a-vis  investment  and  financial decisions of the  firm.  But  then,
administration  goes beyond  the accounting  demands  placed  by the tax, on
firms and government,  under conditions  of "honest  reporting".  One must
discuss  the  ways  in  which  the  choice  among  the  bases  we are  considering  may- 25 -
contribute  to tax  losses  through  enhanced  opportunities  for  tax  planning  or
for  ether  means  to reduce  or escape  taxes  by firms. The literature,  as on
the  above  discussion,  provides  us with  preciously  little  guidance  on these
matters.
b.  Avoidance  and  Evasion
A compliance  problem  arises,  generally,  in the tax treatment  of
losses.  In order  to maintain  neutrality,  it is argued,  tax  losses  should
be fully refundable,  granting the firm a credit or its present-value
equivalent  against  them.  In this manner  risky  assets  are not penalized,
and refundability  of tax losses  becomes  an implicit  deduction  for risk,
with  losses  and  gains  being  fully  shared  by the  government.
Refundability  is  accomplished  by giving  a refundable  tax  credit  to
the  firm,  or carrying  forward  losses  at a rate of interest. And if the
firm  is liquidated,  any tax  credit  owed  to it  should  in  turn  be paid.  This
applies  both to equity-income  and  to cash-flow  taxes. But  tax  losses  are,
in principle,  more likely  with the cash-flow  base,  where taxes due will
typically  be negative  while  the  firm  is  growing  and  investment  is expensed.
The  tax  revenues  owed  by the  firm  may  thus  be uneven,  as  was  noted  earlier.
This depends  on the type of cash flow tax that is instituted. With the
"R+F"  base of the  Meade Report,  the tax  may fluctuate  less.  And if the
modified  method  of cash-flow  taxation  is used,  whereby costs  are
depreciated,  not fully  expensed,  with the  undepreciated  value  of the  base
indexed  by the  rate  of interest,  the  tax  base  need  not  be negative  at  all.
But under the simpler--and  easiest  to run--basic  definition  of the cash-
flow,  important  tax losses  will normally  occur in the early  years of an
investment.- 26  -
Now the  existence  of tax  losses  is  not in itself  a serious  issue,
provided  different  sectors  and activities  are all taxed  and evenly  taxed
across  the economy.  The problem  arises  when income  can be shifted  from
taxed into tax-exempt  or otherwise favored activities  with any ease.
Suppose  for example  that a firm  writes  off capital  with a refundable  tax
credit  paid to it.  If the  firm can  shift  income  to non-taxable  companies
(such  as pension  funds),  credits  paid to the  company  essentially  subsidize
capital  acquision.
The above tax-planning possibilities  are not limited to the
effective management of tax losses.  They are normally  available  more
generally,  for tax-paying  firms to shift income  to activities  that are
exempt  from  or at any  rate favored  by taxation. The  use  of loss-transfers
from a tax-loss  corporation  to a taxpaying  one is only one example of
arbitrage  used  by firms  in  minimizing  tax  payments. But  it is  one that  may
be of relevance  to the  choice  of  base that  interests  us here.
More generally,  tax  avoidance,  and outright  evasion,  arise  in two
broad types of situations.  The first,  due directly  to difficulties  in
properly  measuring  and monitoring  the  tax  base.  This enables  taxpayers  to
take  advantage  in  one form  or the  other  of the  relative  lack  of information
on the part of the tax authorities,  through failure to declare some
transactions  altogether,  under-reporting  or over-invoicing  others,  costing
private  consumption,  etc.  Secondly,  it is  generally  true,  and  particularly
so in less  developed  countries,  that some  activities  cannot  be--or  simply
are  not--taxed,  whether  this  is reflected in the law  or not.  A
considerable  amount of (legal) tax avoidance  takes place this way, as- 27 -
resources  flow  towards  these  opportunities.  Outright  evasion  too is  often
generated  by these  gaps in  the  tax  base,  through  the  use  of mechanisms  like
transfer  pricing, or the inability  of the authorities  to separate  the
accounts  pertaining  to  favored  and  non-favored  activities  performed  jointly
by a firm (such  as exports  vs.  domestic  sales  where  the  former  benefit  from
special  treatment).
It is true that governments  could  often do considerably  more to
avoid  the  erosion  of the  tax  base and  the  allocative  distortions  that  each
of the above problems gives rise to, by closing  gaps, simplifying  the
system and making a serious effort to improve enforcement.  But our
interest  here is more restricted  and specific,  to discuss  and evaluate
alternative  bases  for  the  company  tax  only,  and  it is safer  not to rely  on
a great  deal of progress  with the  reform  of the  rest of the  tax  system  or
of its  administration.
So the question  we need to ask here is not how to get rid of
evasion  and  avoidance,  but  whether  the  characteristics  of the  cash-flow  tax
would  make it  easier  or  harder  to find  opportunities  to evade  or avoid. In
general  terms,  the only  solid  answer  here is, first,  that  we do not  know,
for there is no general theory  of what facilitates  evasion  and, again,
there  is  no wealth  of experience  in the  international  community  on the  use
of cash-flow  taxes to draw from.  And second,  that the main avenues  for
evasion would probably not be affected  at all, for in principle the
informational  needs and resources  of the tax authority  remain  basically
unchanged--it  is only the  way the information  is used that is different.
But  two  or three  further,  if  specific,  features  of the  cash-flow  tax  can  be
mentioned  which give some ground  for concern  that evasion  may be easier
under  it,  in  addition  to the  point  discussed  above:- 28 -
o  First, the cash-flow definition  of "income",  by being less
constant than true economic  income  due to the lumpiness  of
investment  outlays, says less about the standard  of living
(permanent  income)  of the recipient.  This can be important  in
poorer LDCs in particular,  where presumptive indicators  of
income  regularly  play  a  major  role.
O  Secondly,  the  great  disparity  that  the  cash-flow  tax  introduces
between  fiscal  and  economic  variables  opens  the  possibility  for
increased  tax arbitraging,  between  firms  or across  time.  For
example,  a company  with  no taxes  due in the aftermath  of a
large investment outlay, and another one, can engage in
transfer  pricing to boost the non-taxable  revenues of the
former,  which  may then  go into  artificial  liquidation  to start
again in new pastures  (where  it cannot  be taxed). Or a firm
can invest  today  and enjoy  a de facto tax-free  status  for a
while, and then--again--dissolve  itself  when the holiday is
over by selling to a tax-exempt  firm.  The value at which
assets  are sold is  much harder  to police  than the operational
accounts  of the  firm.
One could overemphasize,  however,  the tax  evasion  issues  arising
from  cash  flow  taxation  in  comparison  to the  income  tax. Under the  income
tax,  evasion  possibilities  arise  in  a  number  of contexts: the  reporting  of
capital  gains  and interest,  the  timing  of asset  sales  and inventories,  and
the treatment of compensation  paid to workers.  Tax evasion  under the
income  tax is well documented  and  could  be as important  as that  under  the
cash  flow  tax.- 29 -
2.  International  Issues
International  issues  play  an important  part in  company  tax  policy
for two reasons.  First,  capital,  especially  new capital,  is generally
quite  mobile--unlike  labor  whose  migration  is normally  highly  restricted.
Since capital, and the managerial expertise associated  with it, are
complementary  with employment,  countries often compete for capital to
maintain  their  competitiveness  in  world  production.  Second,  company  income
is also highly  mobile  across  countries,  even  in the presence  of
restrictions  on its flow.  It is quite easy for corporations  to shift
profits  from one country  to another  by rearranging  financial  assets  and
liabilities,  or by using  other  techniques  such  as transfer  pricing,  without
moving  real  resources.  And then,  by taking  advantage  of differences  in tax
regimes  across  countries,  multinational  corporations  minimize  their  payment
of worldwide  company  taxes,  taking  deductions  in high-tax  rate countries
and reporting  income  where tax rates are low.  This,  of course,  can be
partly  controlled  by means  of international  tax  treaties  and  other  methods
that  are  used to tax  and  regulate  the  taxation  of foreign  incomes.
In this  context,  there  are  thus  two  forms  of tax  competition  that
influence a  country's company tax policy.  First, there is calital
competition,  which arises  when countries  try to compete  for investments
available  to  world  markets. And  secondly,  there  is  tax-revenue  competition
that  arises  as countries  seek to attract  and tap taxable  profits  that can
be shifted  from one country  to the  next both in the shorter  run under a
given  international  allocation  of capital  resources  and in the longer  run
as the  latter  move.- 30 -
From the  perspective  of the  present  paper  international  taxation
raises  two important,  separate  but complementary  sets of issues,  each of
which  has received  a considerable  amount  of attention  in recent  tax  reform
efforts  and  proposals. Namely:
o  What is the best company tax policy to pursue by an open
economy:  an Income  Tax, which  is better  at retaining  tax from
financial  outflows  and  remittances;  or a  Rent  Tax,  which  may  be
more effective  at attracting  the  marginal  foreign  investor--or
some  other  tax  or combination  of these?
o  And  on the  other  hand,  to what extent  can a country  pursue  an
independent  company-tax  policy?  Must countries  adopt in law,
or accept  in practice,  essentially  uniform  tax  policies? And
if a country  does  pursue  a different  company  tax system,  such
as cash-flow  taxation  or indeed  an indexed  income  tax system,
what provisions  must be adopted  to ensure  that the  policy  can
be properly  implemented?
The  answers  to these  questions  depend  on two  factors. Firstly,  on
the (de-facto)  openness  of capital  markets  in the  country  in question. If
the country is a small open economy,  which faces  a fixed interest  rate
determined  by international  bond and equity markets and fiy. 4d product
prices, then its company  tax policy  is in turn greatly  restricted:  both
gross  and  net returns  are  wholly  market-driven.  However,  as we discussed
in Section  II above,  international  tax issues  remain  important  to a small
country especially if there is a  large presence of foreign capital
operating  within  its  borders.- 31 -
If the  country  is large,  on the  other  hand,  it  can  influence  rates
of interest  on international  securities  to its  advantage,  and  can thus  use
tax  policy  for  this  purpose--the  country  can  make itself  better  off  at the
expense  of others,  essentially.  For example,  if the country  is a capital
importer,  a tax on investment  that lowers  the international  demand for
capital  forces  down  the  borrowing  rate  faced  by the  country.
Many developing  countries  are  relatively  small,  so it is unlikely
that their  company  tax  policies  influence  international  interest  rates  or
product  prices. For  the  purpose  of the  discussion  below,  we only  consider
the  small  open  economy.
The  second  factor  that  should  be borne  in mind is the  reaction  of
foreign  countries  that  are  negatively  affected  by policies  pursued  by self-
interested  national governments.  In Section II it was argued that a
country imposes company taxes in the interest  of withholding income
accruing  to foreigners.  This is an example  of "tax  exportation",  which  is
beneficial to a country but causes harm to others.  Because of tax
exportation,  countries  may rely too  much on distortive  capital  taxes  that
may  be avoided  if  the  countries  signed  cooperative  agreements.
Keeping in mind the above two factors,  we address the three
questions  listed  above:  (a)  what is the  best company  tax  base for  an open
economy,  (b)  must  company  tax  bases  be uniform  worldwide  and  (c)  how  can  an
independent  tax  policy  be implemented.
a.  Companv  Taxation  in  an Open  Economy
In Section  II we have already  discussed  the role of the company
tax  in  withholding  income  from  foreigners.  In this  subsection,  we  wish to
be more  precise  about  the  role  of  company  taxation  in an  open  economy.- 32 -
In an open economy,  two particular  issues  arise  with respect  to
company taxation.  The  first is the taxation of income accruing to
foreigners,  and the second is the taxation  of foreign-source  income  of
resident  corporations.  It is the  first  of these  that  has greater  interest
in the case of LDCs.  On the other  hand, in addition  to the company  tax
there  is the withholding  tax levied  on income  accruing  to non-residents,
which is often reduced by treaty  negotiation.  The withholding  tax is
sometimes  viewed  as a tax-sharing  device  where  one country  allows  foreign
withholding  taxes  to  be credited  against  their  own  taxes  levied  on foreign-
source  income. In our discussion  below,  we consider  withholding  taxes  as
one  form  of taxation  at the  company  level.
With respect  to the first issue,  one can consider  two types  of
foreign recipients  of income:  foreign  individuals  (or  corporations),  and
governments.  If foreign  governments  exempt  foreign-source  income,  income
earned  by a compan--  fully  accrues  to the foreign  private  sector. A small
open economy  would  find that the  most efficient  tax would  be a rent tax,
since  the  distortion  of  foreign-capital  investment  decisions  is
undesirable.
If foreign governments tax foreign-source  income accruing to
investors,  and  credit  foreign  corporate  taxes  paid  by their  resident  firm,
the type of company tax desired by a capital importing country is
different. Even if the  capital  importing  country  is small,  an income  tax
that  qualifies  for  foreign  tax  crediting  may  be desirable.  Many countries,
such as the United  States,  Japan and the United  Kingdom,  credit  foreign
taxes  paid on repatriated  income-dividends,  interest,  royalties  and  branch
profits. Often,  but  not  always,  the  retentions  of foreign  subsidiaries  are
exempt from taxation  by capital  exporting  countries.  If this were the- 33 -
case, a company tax on repatriated  income would be desirable  for the
capital  importing  country,  since there is no efficiency  loss due to tax
crediting  abroad.  In certain  cases  it might  be  difficult  for a
multinational  firm  to  credit  foreign  taxes. For  example,  since  interest  is
deductible  from the tax base in a capital  exporting  country,  a corporate
tax  in a capital  importing  country  that  does  not  allow  the  deductibility  of
interest  may be too large  for the multinational  to credit.  For a small
capital  importing  country,  an  uncredited  tax  would  distort  capital  inflows.
With regard to the taxation  of foreign-source  income  earned  by
residents,  the  main issue  faced  by a country  is whether  income  should  be
taxed  or be exempt  from taxation. If the  country  is small,  one  can argue
that it would be efficient  not to tax these  capital  flows at all: only
source-based  company  taxation  is desirable,  to allow  domestic  investors  to
obtain the greatest  possible  rents from capital  invested  abroad.  Many
small countries have followed this course by exempting foreign-source
income.  If foreign-source  income  is earned  in a "tax-haven",  the  capital
exporting  country  may choose to tax the income  only to protect its own
company  tax  base.  These issues  relate  to implementation  of company  taxes
that  are  discussed  in  more  detail  below.
Currently, capital exporting countries  that tax foreign-source
income  allow  foreign  corporate  income  and  withholding  taxes  to  be credited.
Sales  and  property  taxes  are  deductible  from  taxable  income. If  a capital
importing  country  wants to  maintain  maximal  crediting,  it  wishes  to ensure
that  its  own  company  tax  is recognized  by the  capital  exporting  country  as
a creditable  tax.  For  example,  would  a rent  tax  such  as a cash  flow  tax  be- 34 -
creditable?  What about  a tax  on dividends  (such  as the  Advance  Corporate
Income  Tax)  or a tax  on the  capital  assets?  These  issues  can  be important
if there is a significant  amount of foreign capital invested in the
capital-importing country.
b.  Uniformity  of  Tax  Bases
Company  tax reform  has been remarkable  for its similarity  across
countries.  In most countries,  corporate  tax  rates  have been lowered  and
the tax base broadened  by reducing  tax incentives.  It has often been
argued that a country is forced  into following  the tax reform  measures
adopted  by others  in order  to preserve  the  company  tax  base.  But, given
the multidimensional  nature  of tax policy,  and with many other relevant
instruments  at hand, does it still follow that it is impossible  for a
country  to  pursue  an independent  company  tax  policy?
Two arguments have been advanced as to why countries choose
uniform company tax policies.  The first is the "capital  competition"
explanation  suggested  above,  which forces  countries  to adopt  uniform tax
bases,  for  if there  were  differences  capital  would  flow  to the  least  taxed
country.  In order that tax-induced  movements  in capital are avoided,
countries  choose  similar  tax  bases  and  rates.
This  argument  is largely  unconvincing. It is truer,  if anything,
as a statement  on the  level  of taxation,  rather  than  on the  structure.  And
then,  although  political  pressure  might  prevail  on a government  to tax  an
industry  similarly  to what is done in a foreign  jurisdiction,  there  is  no
clear economic  justification  for the equalization.  Even if capital is
relatively  mobile, tax regimes  could  differ  depending  on the use of tax
revenue,  and certainly  the structure,  with other tax instruments  coming- 35 -
into play.  If, for example,  a given country  were to stick to a high-
rate/many-incentives  approach,  it will admittedly  not see internationally
mobile  capical  coming  into  its  taxed  sectors,  as argued. But,  by the  same
token,  it will or may see resources  flowing  into  the sectors  the country
manifestly  wishes  to  promote! Counter-arguments  along  macroeconomic  lines.
to the  effect  that  those  firms  will  not  go into  that  country  because  it is
or will fall into fiscal  chaos would not be at all convincing  in this
connection: the general  statement  cannot  be made, and the argument  that
taxes need to fall into line pertains to a different  order of ideas.
Similarly,  and leaving  aside  the issue  of crediting,  a small  open economy
might  find it  in its  interest  to levy  a cash-flow  tax  so that  capital  flows
are not distorted.  If other countries then choose  distortive  capital
taxes, there  is no reason for the small economy to adopt a similar
distortive  capital tax.  Moreover,  if company  taxation  is an important
source  of revenue,  a country  might  be willing  to choose  a higher  capital
tax  than  other  countries  to  finance  public  expenditures.  While  tax  regimes
in countries  might affect  each other and capital  competition  would come
into  play,  uniformity  of taxes  is  not  the  necessary  outcome.
A better  argument  for  some  degree  of uniformization  to be imposed
among countries  arises  in relation  to "tax revenue  competition",  in the
face  of the  rich opportunities  for internationl  tax-arbitraging  that  firms
or groups  of firms  can enjoy.  Namely,  if a country  chooses  a tax system
that is significantly  different  from others',  the tax may not be easily
implementable,  since  a company  can easily  shift  reported  profits  from  one
country  to the  next.  This argument  especially  applies  when statutory  tax
rates  differ.  Transfer  pricing  techniques, financing and  leasing
arrangements,  and  other  tax  planning  devices  are  used to  ensure  that  income- 36 -
is  reported  in low  taxed  countries,  and  deductions  are  declared  where  taxes
are  high.  Some  jurisdictions  in Canada,  such  as Quebec,  have chosen  very
low  corporate  income  tax  rates  (using  other  capital  taxes  instead)  to avoid
transfer  pricing  and  other  arbitrage  schemes.
"Tax  revenue  competition"  is a problem  treated  quite  seriously  by
governments.  It often leads to the adoption  of distortive  company  tax
bases, but ones that are uniform  with those in the rest of the world.
Arguments  are often  raised  against  indexed  company  income,  and cash flow
taxes on the basis that no other  country  has a similar  tax.  The usual
justification  for uniform  tax bases  is that  tax  arbitrage  gives
multinational  corporations  an advantage  compared  to domestic  firms.  It
might  be possible  to  pursue  other  company  tax  policies  so long  as they  are
implementable.
c.  Unilateral  Adoltion  of  New  Directions  on ComDany  Taxation
The extent  to which a country  can pursue  an independent  company
tax  policy  depends  on the  prevailing  tax  systems  in  various  countries.  To
implement  a company  tax  that is  not  similar  to other  countries  requires  an
intricate understanding of international tax systems.  It  is quite
difficult  to discuss  these  issues  in detail  but a few points  are raised
below  to illustrate  some  of the  problems  that  might  arise.
If a country  tries  to implement  a cash flow  or an income  tax  with
fast writeoffs  and with a tax rate highe-r  than that in other  countries,
several  immediate  issues  arise.  First,  some costs  such as overhead  costs
that are  may be expensed  or depreciated  quickly,  tend to be allocated  to
the jurisdiction  that provides  the most generous  incentive.  It is also
possible for the firm operating in a cash flow jurisdiction  to lease- 37 -
capital  to the  parent  or  associated  companies  operating in other
jurisdictions  especially  when those  jurisdictions  provide  incentives  less
favorable  to capital. Thus  the  cash  flow  tax  could  encourage  investment  in
other  countries.
Second,  if interest  deductions  are limited  to a real  basis  or not
allowed  at all, a company  could  try to issue  debt in jurisdictions  that
allow  nominal  interest  to be  deducted.  By  making  a  number  of
intercorporate  transactions  that  avoid  further  taxation,  the  debt  could  be
used to finance  the  acquisition  of  capital  in the  jurisdiction  implementing
the  cash flow  or indexed  income  tax.  The  country  that  imposes  the  indexed
equity  income  or cash flow tax could  earn more tax revenue,  however,  if
multinational  companies  become  more  equity  financed.
Third,  if the  tax  rate levied  with a cash flow  or indexed  equity
income tax is higher than in other jurisdictions,  there will be an
incentive  for  multinational  companies  to  underprice  goods  exported  from  the
jurisdiction. These  policies  are  particularly  effective  if the goods  are
sold  to  associated  companies  operating  in foreign  jurisdictions.  Interest,
royalties  and lease  payments  on non-arm's  length  transactions  could also
allow  profits  to  be shifted  to low  tax  rate  countries.
The  extent  to  which  these  arbitrage  possibilities  exist  depends  as
well on the method  used by countries  to tax foreign-source  income.  For
example,  transfer  price  mechanisms  may not  work if foreign  taxes  are fully
credited  by the  capital  exporting  country  so that  differences  in tax  rates
cannot  be exploited  by the  multinational  firm.- 38 -
These  implementation  issues  suggest  that  international
considerations  must be dealt  with before  a country  adopts  an independent
company  tax system.  How important  these issues  are ultimately  depends  on
the  ability  of tax  authorities  to devise  tax  systems  that  avoid  the  erosion
or distortion  of their  tax  base.
3.  Transition  Issues
Perhaps  the  most difficult  problem  faced  when implementing  a new
tax are transition  arrangements. In most situations, windfall  gains  or
losses are spread unevenly across the population.  Transition  clearly
affects the distributive  impact  of taxes as well as the amount of tax
revenue  raised  by government.  Moreover, transition  can affect  the  impact
of the  tax  system  on allocative  efficiency  is  discussed  below.
Two stances  may  be adopted  with regard  to transition  issues. The
first  is to avoid  any  windfall  losses  or gains  arising  from  the imposition
of a new  company  tax  base.  This may  be done to avoid  windfall  gains  or
losses  for  distributive  or  political  reasons. Moreover,  since  firms  in the
past  made  decisions  based  on the  tax  system  existing  at that  time,  it  would
be retroactive  to change  the rules  of the game after  decisions  have been
made.  Otherwise,  the  private  sector  may view tax  policy  as non-credible.
In this  context,  windfall  gains  and  losses  are  no longer  "windfall"  since
firms  adjust their expectations  with respect to the evolution  of tax
policy.
The second attitude  to take is that tax policies  which create
windfall  losses  (gains)  for  the  public  may  be  quite  efficient
(inefficient). For example,  suppose  that a government  chooses  to limit
interest  deductions  to a  real  basis,  as in  the  case  of an indexed  corporate- 39 -
income  tax,  or to  eliminate  interest  deductions,  as in the  case  of the  cash
flow tax.  Firms that are levered  when the transition  takes  place would
find that their company tax payments have increased  substantially.
However, from the point of view of the government,  the tax  would be
efficient,  by reducing  the wealth  of the firm's  shareowners  who must pay
the  tax.
Hence,  a sudden  change  in tax  regime,  particularly  in the  context
of company  taxation  where the treatment  of stocks  (past  decisions)  is at
the center of the picture, is de facto retroactive. The transitional
impact  of a new company tax therefore  depends  not only on the existing
features  of the old tax, but also or.  the  desired  treatment  of old assets
under  the  new  regime. Old  assets  may  be exempted  from  tax  changes,  or they
may  be treated  on the  same  basis  as new assets. If it is the former,  old
assets  may increase  in value  if new assets  are  more highly  taxed  (or  vice
versa). If is  the  latter,  old  assets  may  be taxed  differently  depending  on
existing  and  new  laws.
If a  company  income tax  is replaced by one  on cash flow,
transition  is a most important  issue  quantitatively--the  whole  depreciable
stock and outstanding  debt of the corporate  sector  must be moved across
fiscal  regimes. The obvious  possibility  that is sometimes  advanced  as to
how to arrange  the  transition  is to simply  exempt  old assets  from  the  cash
flow tax, and correspondingly  to retain  the old treatment  of old debt.
This requires that the old assets  be depreciated  on the same basis as
before,  which does not represent  a major problem.  But it also requires
that interest  payments  on the debt outstanding  upon introduction  of the
change  continue  to  be allowed--and  not  so the  interest  on new debt. 9 That- 40 -
is, the requirement  is to be able to keep track  administratively  of the
different  vintages  of debt incurred  by the firm,  which allows  unbounded
manipulation  by any  half-creative  tax  accountant  in the employment  of the
enterprise.  This is somewhat  unfortunate,  since the treatment  of old
expenses  and  projects  fully  on the  basis  of the  tax  contractual  arrangement
that  prevailed  when they  were incurred  or adopted,  applying  the  new rules
to new decisions  only,  surely  is the  legally,  politically  and in some  way
economically most  satisfactory solution.  But  an administratively
friendlier  one  must  be sought.
The simplest  such solution,  perhaps,  would  be to permit  the full
expensing of all remaining  depreciation  deductions  on old assets,  with
interest  no longer  deductible. The probleu  is that the ti.me-profile  of
deductions  and  debt-repayment  the  firm  has  been  engaged  in in the  past,  on
any  one  old investment,  are  not  the  same. The  gain  on the  sudden  expensing
side may in some cases greatly  exceed  or fall short of the loss on the
sudden non-costing  of interest.  Some firms will face bankruptcy,  and
inequities  galore  will  be claimed. The  authorities  will  have to  compromise
and improvise  patch-up  exercises.  Other  approaches  can be devised,  that
variously  perform  better  on the economic  or administrative  sides.  But  we
have  not found  a nice,  painless  solution.
As for the  tax revenue  raised  by the  government,  the impact  of a
shift  from  income  to cash  flow  taxes  depends  on two  factors: (i)  the  type
of transitional changes (as discussed above) and  (ii) the existing
provisions  of the income  tax.  In regard  to (i), a cash flow tax that
applies  to  both  new  and  existing  assets  could  yield  substantial  tax  revenue
for  the  government  since  old  assets  would  no longer  be granted  depreciation
and interesc  writeoffs  and  would  be fully  taxed  if  sold  to other  firms. If- 41 -
however,  old  assets  were  exempt,  tax  revenue  earned  by the  government  could
fall.  This depends,  however,  on (ii).  As we remarked  earlier,  some  LDCs
provide  substantial  writeoffs  for  capital  (i.e.  Bangladesh  and  Malaysia)  or
give firms  tax  holidays  (i.e.  Morocco  and  Thailand)  such that the removal
of interest  deductibility  under the  cash flow tax could  raise  substantial
revenue  for the government.  In ather  countries,  reverue  could be lost
especially  if the  corporate  tax  has  served  as  a rent-collecting  device  with
few  fast  writeoffs  or tax  holidays  for  investment.
IV.  Conclusion
This paper is meant to raise some of the issues  that would be
involved  in trying  to implement  a company  tax either in the form of an
indexed  equity  income  or a cash flow  tax.  There  are a number  of concerns
that have been  raised that go far beyond  the usual  efficiency and
distributive  issues  that have been discussed  in the literature. Some of
these questions or problem-areas require much more investigation  at
different  levels  than what has been put  into the discussion.  In
particular,  open  economy  and  administrative issues are of crucial
importance  in  designing  the  company  tax.
One view commonly  adopted,  explicitly  or otherwise,  is that the
way to  proceed  might  be best  to determine  first  what  type  of  base  should  be
adopted and then worry  about administrative issues afterwards.  As
discussed  in Section  II,  the  motive  for  adopting  a company  tax  depends  in
part  on the  type  of personal  tax  that is  desired  and  the  degree  to  which  a
country  may wish to withhold  income  from foreigners. But the discussion
inevitably  arises  at the level  of policy  debate  itself,  and remains  open- 42 -
for  continual discussion, of whether a particular tax base can be
effectively  implemented,  especially  taking into account administrative
weaknesses and  requirements, as well as other  (e.g. international)
considerations.
In a closed  economy,  especially  one that relies  on a consumption
tax  at the  personal  level,  the  cash-flow  tax seems  to  be a simple  and  most
efficient  form to give to company  taxation.  It is relatively  straight-
forward  to administer  and is  neutral  with  respect  to investment  decisions.
The equity-income  tax is in contrast  inherently  more complicated  to run,
and  there  is little  to  argue  in  favor  of it in  a closed  economy,  other  than
perhaps  some arguments  raised  above  in relation  to evasion  opportunities,
which  nevertheless  do not  seem  to  be very  major.
A more  fundamental problem that should concern proponents,
however,  and which does concern  potential  practitioners,  is the lack of
experience  with the tax in other  countries,  which  one would like to draw
from.  In the  absence  of it it is impossible  to predict  what exactly  the
administrative  difficulties  and the performance  of the tax would be in
practice. A lot  of thinking  preceded  the  introduction  of  VAT in  just  a few
countries several decades ago and other countries only began to toy
seriously  with the  idea  of adopting  it  after  a fair  amount  of  experience  in
its administration  in other  countries  was available. If uncertainty  is a
cost in decision contexts in economics, this factor must represent  a
sizable  minus  on the  balance,  from  the  point  of  view  of potential  customers
of the  cash-flow  tax  in  the  developing  world.- 43 -
And another  weighty  problem  which has perhaps  not received  the
attention  it  deserves  in  proposals  and  discussions  of the  topic  is the  way
it fits  or fails  to fit  into  the  international  economy. A case  can  be made
in this context for equity income  taxation.  If the country  has a large
foreign-owned  sector,  the  equity  income  tax  may  be the  best form  of tax  to
withhold  income  from  foreigners.  The  tax  is credited  against  foreign  taxes
and so, in certain  circumstances,  has little  effect  on investment. An
equity  income  tax is similar  to that  used in other countries,  minimizing
the  possibility  of tax  arbitrage  that  could  dissipate  the  company  tax  base.
On the  other  hand,  the  equity  income  tax  is--or  becomes  more--distortionary
to the extent  that it is not credited  abroad. And some times,  as in the
case  of  petroleum  and  mining  royalties  which  are  meant  to  be "rents",  taxes
are  not  credited  at all  against  fore..gn  taxes. This  could  make the  case  in
favor  of a cash-flow  tax  more  important. The  cash  flow tax  has the  virtue
of being  neutral,  while  continuing  to withhold  rents  accruing to
foreigners--which  for  example  a  Value-Added  Tax  on a destination  basis  does
not do since  the tax is only paid by residents.  To this extent a
countervailing  argument  can  be made  for  a cash-flow  tax  in an open  economy
as  well.- 44 -
FOOTNOTES
/  For a good discussion of the economic principles  behind cash flow
taxation see, e.g., the U.S. Treasury's 1977 BlueRrints report, King
(1987),  or  Meade  et.al.  (1978),  which  has  become  a classic  reference  in  the
area.  There  are a number  of different  cash flow tax  bases  that could  be
considered.  The  Meade  Report  discussed  three  alternatives  but others  could
be considered  as well.  Below,  we will discuss  different  tax bases all
based  on the  cash  flow  principle.
2/  See the Royal Commission  on Taxation's  Renort (1967)  and the U.S.
Treasury's  ReRort  to  the  President  (1984).
3/  There  are  some  suggested  schemes  that  could  be used to assess  taxes  on
capital  gains  at the time of sale that  would  be "accrual-equivalent",  by
taking into account the value to the investor of postponing realized
capital-gains  taxes  by  holding  assets  longer. See  Auerbach  (1988).
4/  And  perhaps  an  unfortunate  example,  given  its  abstract  nature  that  says
little  to  most,  and  given  the  fact  that  labor  markets  in  many  LDCs  arguably
are in rationed equilibria  where, for many labor types, individuals'
notional  labor  supplies  are  not  driving  their  employment  at the  margin.
5/  The  above  expression  should  should  be  interpreted  to  include
revaluation  of inventories  in Ra and their interest cost in Ca.  In
practice,  dealing  with inventories  on a real  accrual  basis  is rather  hard,
and ad hoc rules  are used instead. For simplicity  of exposition  we will
omit any further  reference  to inventories  in this section,  on the formal
statement of the bases, and bring them back to the discussion  in the
sections  on implementation  below.
6/  See  R. Boadway  and  N. Bruce  (1988).
7/  The  U.S.  proposals  for  indexation  avoided  the  reporting  of liabilities
by allowing  firms  to deduct  only a proportion  of interest,  the  rate  being
determined  by the  ratio  of inflation  to  a  base interest  rate.
8/  With  one  exception,  which is the  need,  also faced  under  an income  tax,
to index loss-carry-forwards  and tax obligations.  But  it is in the
computation  of the base that inflation  is much trickier  to deal with in
income  tax,  and  where it ceases  to  be an issue  in cash flow  as the  latter
always  measures  costs  and  revenues  in  dollars  contemporary  to the  tax  due.
9/  Equivalent  problems  arise if the cash flow tax-type  adopted  is, say,
BR+F (with  financial  flows  included  in the  base).- 45 -
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